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Sunday 20 March 2016

Caliphate agenda and ideology: Caliphate Colonialism-The taproot of the trouble with Nigeria (Part 2)

Part Two: Caliphate agenda and ideology in their own words, 1942-2012

The quotes below are taken from the works of two Nigerian scholars, Prof Omo Omoruyi and Dr Tony Nwaezeigwe. The excerpts detail the Caliphate ideology and show how Nigeria has been dominated by the Caliphate Colonialist agenda since the 1950s. For the post-1990s period, the excerpts from these two works are supplemented by media reports.


The Caliphate ideology and agenda are byproducts of the British design of Nigeria. Let us, therefore, begin by examining the British design, as explained by Prof. Omoruyi.

The British design (1884-1960)

Excerpts from Omo Omoruyi,  The  Tale of June 12, London: Press Alliance Network Limited, 1999. All the “(Italics mine)” are by Omo Omoruyi. [This Omoruyi book is probably the best participant-observer report on June 12 that we are ever likely to get. Nigerians are fortunate that Prof. Omoruyi survived an Abacha assassination attempt in 1994, and still had the courage to write it.  The book should be compulsory reading for every Nigerian .]

There is no question that there were relatively independent units, call them states/empires, in the territory that currently makes up Nigeria before the advent of the white man and the colonial order. Anthropologists and the Ibadan History Series provide us with the history and form of political organisation of different groups in Nigeria. Following the Berlin Conference of 1884, [Frederick] Lugard, then a Captain, paid his first visit to Nigeria to organise on behalf of the Royal Niger Company, troops of subjugation to be used in extracting treaties from the Chiefs of the North. The various groups in Nigeria had no inkling that Britain was trying to amalgamate them.
Britain’s implementation of the Berlin Treaty was done through independent administrators, namely:
1. The Oil Rivers Protectorate, renamed Niger Coast Protectorate in 1895. The Niger Coast Protectorate was ruled by Consul with headquarters in Calabar and responsible to the Foreign Office, not the Colonial Office, because the relationship with these states was by virtue of treaties of protection and by cession.
2. The Colony of Lagos ceded to the British Crown in 1861 was ruled by Governors responsible to the Colonial Office based in Sierra Leone (1866-1874) and Gold Coast (1874-1886).
In 1886, Lagos had its own Governor. Cession of Lagos was through a highly fraudulent treaty. There was a treaty of Cession, nevertheless.
3. The Niger territories of the Royal Niger Company rule, 1886 to 1899 by the agents of the private company, was responsible to the Board of Directors in London. This corresponds to the present day Northern Nigeria. Sir Frederick D Lugard had, earlier as a Captain, worked for this company in negotiating a series of treaties with traditional rulers in 1897. He was, as a Brigadier-General, appointed the first High Commissioner of the former Niger Territories of the Royal Niger Company to be called Northern Nigeria with effect from January 1, 1900. 
This was the day the term Nigeria was first used in official communication. It would appear that the term was meant to refer to the North of Nigeria and later the other two governments were renamed Southern Nigeria and Lagos. They were merged to form Southern Nigeria in 1906. From 1906, Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria were technically two autonomous entities responsible separately to the colonial office.
This was the situation when the design of Nigeria was conceived between 1900 and 1912. It should be noted that Lugard brought the various parts of the North together and produced an administrative entity called first, Niger Territories and later Northern Nigeria. (pp. 295-296)

[The 1913 Harcourt-Lugard plan of permanent Northern rule.  (pp. 296-301) ]

Q7) 1913
Lord Harcourt [British Secretary of State for the Colonies] laid down the kind of relationship that should exist between North and the South as a marriage with the North as the "husband" and the South as the "wife." According to Lord Harcourt:
We have released Northern Nigeria from the leading strings of the Treasury.  The promising and well conducted youth is now on an allowance on his own and is about to effect an alliance with a  Southern lady of means. I have issued the special license and Sir Frederick Lugard will perform the ceremony. May the union be fruitful and the couple constant. 20 (Italics mine)  (p. 300)
. . .
It should be further noted that Lugard was privy to the thinking in London about amalgamation. This was why he campaigned to be given the assignment of incorporating the various units in South constituting Southern Nigeria into Northern Nigeria. (p. 296) . . .
According to [Margery] Perham, Lugard’s task was to unify administrations not peoples. Lugard was bent on keeping the North as one entity. (p. 299) . . .
Lugard was called the maker of Northern Nigeria who later returned to Nigeria to complete his work which to him meant incorporating more territories into the North. 21   (p. 301)

[The Robertson stage (1955-1960) of the Harcourt-Lugard-Robertson plan of permanent Northern rule.  (pp.294-306]

Q8) 1955-1960
The next phase in Nigerian history was the decolonisation period and it involved the resolution of the succession claims, erroneously though, of the three major nationalities, Hausa-Fulani (North), Yoruba (West) and Igbo (East) during this period. It centred around who would succeed the colonial government between 1955 and 1960. . . . Sir James Robertson was the shrewd implementor of Northern rule earlier fashioned by Lords Harcourt and Lugard. Sir James was especially recruited by the British Government in 1955 because of his experience in the Sudan with an identical situation to Nigeria.  . . . (p. 302)
The 1914 design [of Nigeria as a marriage between the North and South with the North as the "husband" and the South, "the Wife" ] became an issue in 1950, 1953 and 1966 . . . [In the 1950s, it] was used to extract 50 percent of the seats in the proposed Central House of Representatives by the Northern delegation led by the Emirs of Katsina and Zaria, failing which they threatened that "they would ask for separation from the rest of Nigeria on the arrangements existing before 1914." 6 The Northern leaders led by Sir Ahmadu Bello threatened to withdraw the North from Nigeria unless the self-government motion moved by Chief Anthony Enahoro in March 1953 was killed by the British government and lamented that "the mistake of 1914 has come to light. 7  . . . (p. 294)
Q9) 1957
Sir James named Sir Abubakar, the Prime Minister, in 1957 even though the NPC at that time only controlled one region (North) and had only one third of the Ministers in the Federal Council of Ministers and the NCNC controlled two regions (East and West) and two thirds of the Ministers in the Federal Council of Ministers. Sir James named Sir Abubakar over the NCNC Ministers because
We became very close and I appreciated the confidence he placed in me. There was little we could not discuss (including) the problems with the Sardauna of Sokoto (and) his difficulties with noisy Southerners who seemed to take all their squabbles and troubles to him. 36  (Italics mine)
Sir James went on:
We discussed  defence and  foreign affairs and I showed him all the British Government papers that came to me about neighbouring countries and the trends in foreign affairs  although they were not supposed to be shown to the Nigerian. 37  (Italics mine)
But Sir James violated this because
I never had the slightest fear that he would abuse my confidence and  (because) I had the greatest admiration for him as a man of the highest integrity and a most religious and sincere Muslim." (Italics mine)  (p. 305)
Q10) 1959
Sir James confessed that he called Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa to form the government in 1959 "by persuading some of the Southern members to support him and Sir Abubakar assured him he would get a Southern group to work with him." Sir James did this before the results were released in full. He confessed that he did this to appease the Sardauna of Sokoto, the Leader of NPC, to stop him from taking the North out of Nigeria. 24    (p. 302)

 The manipulation of the 1959 election results:  [An account by Chinweizu]

The 1959 election was manipulated to deliver power to the Calphate. The electoral mechanisms which accomplished that feat was a combination of the 1952 arbitrary allocation of 50 per cent of the seats in the Federal parliament to the North as demanded by the Emirs; the census of 1953 which assigned to the North 55.4% of the total population  [20]  in what seemed to be an effort to retroactively justify the 1952 allocation of parliamentary seats [this caused the census to be regarded as rigged]; and the Governor General’s inviting of Balewa to form a government even before the election results were complete. As a result, power over the whole of Nigeria was placed in the hands of the Caliphate rulers of the North. The 1959 election results were as follows  [21] :
National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons 
Action Group 
Northern People's Congress *
Northern Elements Progressive Union 
Mabolaje Grand Alliance *
Igala Union *
Igbira Tribal Union *
Niger Delta Congress *
Source: Nohlen et al.
 Northern People's Congress -led coalition (148 seats)
†  National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons -led coalition (89 seats)
‡  Action Group -led coalition (75 seats)
By converting the least votes into the most seats, this Robertson election-rigging mechanism ensured that the NPC became the dominant partner in the federal government. Had proportional representation been applied, the NCNC-NEPU Alliance which garnered 3,103,627 votes (40.7%) would have had the most seats and produced the Prime Minister.  Alternatively, even with the rigged distribution of seats, had Zik and Awo brought their NCNC and AG alliances into coalition, the NCNC-AG coalition would have had 164 seats to the NPC’s 148. And the Governor-General, Sir James Robertson, would have been obliged to ask the NCNC-AG coalition to form the government.
Either way, the NCNC leader Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (a.k.a. Zik), would have become Nigeria’s Prime Minister at independence, and Nigeria’s history might have been quite different. But that was essentially prevented by the British managers of the transition to independence, when Sir James Robertson invited Tafawa Balewa to form the government even before the rigged results were fully in. Consequently, when the results were finally out, the option of an NCNC-AG Coalition had been basically ruled out, and these parties were faced with the option of going into junior partnership with the already designated Prime Minister.
An NCNC-AG coalition government, led by Zik as Prime Minister and Awo as Deputy Prime Minister would have been an ideologically Pan-Africanist government. [It should be recalled that Awo, along with Nkrumah, Kenyatta etc. had taken part in the 5 th Pan-African Congress in 1945; and Zik, though absent himself, was represented by the delegation sent by his party, the NCNC.] But the feud between Zik and Awo helped to block this coalition by preventing them from jointly challenging the choice of Prime Minister already made by the Governor General. So, instead of Nigeria at independence being led by a Pan-Africanist government, it came to be led by a government dominated by the Pan-Islamist NPC of Sir Ahmadu Bello and Tafawa Balewa.
 [Back to excerpts from Omo Omoruyi,  The Tale of June 12, London: Press Alliance Network Limited, 1999.]
Q11) 1959
What Sir James Robertson did in 1959 was in furtherance of the colonial policy dating back to 1913 [when Lord Harcourt proposed the “marriage” of the “Northern youth,” to “the Southern lady of means”].
Sir James Robertson also stated in his memoir that he prepared Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in the late 1950’s for the position of leadership of Nigeria by sharing with him sensitive security issues about British interests in Nigeria and how he, Sir James “unofficially and unconstitutionally” assigned defence, police and foreign affairs matters before independence to Sir Abubakar.  . . .(p. 303)
 By the rule of succession, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), with no elected member from the South in the House of Representatives, succeeded to the British colonial power in Nigeria in 1960 and became the successor of the British Crown in Nigeria. Sir James was bent on implementing the succession plan in favour of the North. How did he do it? 
The Northern leaders were “good boys” and could be trusted; the Southern leaders were “bad boys,” and could not be trusted. Sir James did everything to prepare Sir Ahmadu Bello, who had no faith in the 1914 amalgamation, to accept the Federal Government and the Nigerian union.  . . .  (p. 304)
Finally, Sir James did not have faith in what would happen at the end of the day. He quoted the note he kept in December 1956 as follows:
The general outlook of the people (North) is so different from those in Southern Nigeria as to give them practically nothing in common. There is less difference between an Englishman and Italian, both of whom have a common civilisation based on Greek and Roman foundations and on Christianity, than between a Muslim villager in Sokoto, Kano or Katsina, and an Ibo, Ijaw or a Kalabari. How can any feeling of common purpose of nationality be built up between people whose culture, religion and mode of living is so completely different? (Italics mine.)
He was very worried as to what would happen when the British shall have gone. He was not sure of what would keep the diverse peoples together within the artificial boundaries drawn on the map in the 1880s and 1890s. (p.306)

Caliphate  ideology  and Agenda--Section A

[Quotes from Tony Nwaezeigwe, “Ethnicity and the Politics of Igbo, Yoruba Relations: Case of a  Celebration of Defeat?”, Department of Political Science University of Lagos: Special Lecture Series 2, October 1998, pp. 5-8.]
Q12) 1942
“Holding this country together is not possible except by means of the religion of the Prophet. If they want political unity let them follow our religion.”  15
--  1942, the conference of Northern Chiefs in response to a letter from the UK-based West African Students’ Union (WASU) to the Northern Emirs asking them to support the constitutional evolution of Nigeria into a full  independent nation.
15  Quoted from Obafemi Awolowo,  Path to Nigerian Freedom, London: Faber and Faber, 1947, p. 51. }
Q13) 1944
“Those Southerners who desire a United Nigeria should first embrace Islam as their religion.” 16
-- 1944, the Sultan of Sokoto responding to a delegation from WASU that paid him a visit to plead for his support for the memorandum on constitutional reform.
16  James Coleman,  Nigeria :  Background to Nationalism, Los Angeles and London: University of California, Berkeley, 1971, p. 361. }
Q14) 1948
“Since 1914 the British Government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, but the Nigeria people themselves are historically different in their background, in their religious beliefs and customs and do not show themselves any sign of willingness to unite.... Nigerian unity is only a British intention for the country.” 17
-- 1948, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, parliamentary leader of the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC), during a session of the Nigerian Legislative council.
17  Coleman,  Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, p. 320 }
Q15 )  1948
“Many (Nigerians) deceive themselves by thinking that Nigeria is one, . . . particularly some of the press people. . . This is wrong. I am sorry to say that this presence of Unity is artificial and it ends outside this Chamber. . . The Southern tribes who are now pouring into the North in ever increasing numbers, and are more or less domiciled here do not mix with the Northern people... and we in the North look upon them as invaders   18
-- 1948, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, parliamentary leader of the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC), during the budget session of the Nigerian Legislative council.
18  Coleman,  Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, p. 361 }
As pointed out earlier, in 1960, the Sarduana of Sokoto stated his Nigeria Project thus: [See  Q1, above]
[Back to quotes from Tony Nwaezeigwe, “Ethnicity and the Politics of Igbo, Yoruba Relations: Case of a Celebration of Defeat?”]

Today, it is no longer a matter of debate that the Hausa-Fulani ruling oligarchy of this country has the sole objective of remaining the hereditary rulers of Nigeria. A far-reaching revelation in this regard is summed up in the words of one of the most respected members of the group: [See  Q3 above]
--- Nwaezeigwe, p. 8
[Comment by Chinweizu]
The quote from Maitama Sule, (See  Q3 above) also articulated the Caliphate caste system for Nigeria.
Please compare Maitama Sule’s allegedly divine division of roles, caste system, with the notorious white supremacist doctrine of the European imperialists. As Ernest Renan, the western humanist and idealist philosopher from France, would express it:
“The regeneration of the inferior or degenerate races by the  superior races is part of the providential order of things for humanity. . . . Nature has made a race of workers, the Chinese race, who have wonderful manual dexterity and almost no sense of honor; govern them with justice, levying from them, in return for the blessing of such a government, an ample allowance for the conquering race, and they will be satisfied; a race of tillers of the soil, the Negro; treat him with kindness and humanity, and all will be as it should; a race of masters and soldiers, the European race. Reduce this noble race to working in the  ergastulum like Negroes and Chinese, and they rebel. . . . But the life at which our workers rebel would make a Chinese or a fellah happy, as they are not military creatures in the least.  Let each one  do what he is made for, and all will be well.” 2
{  2  From  La Rêforme intellectuelle et morale, quoted in Aimé Césaire,  Discourse   on   Colonialism    (New   York:   Monthly   Review   Press, 1972), p. 16. [See Chinweizu,  The West and the Rest of Us, p.401]}

Caliphate  ideology  and Agenda--Section B

Continuation of excerpts from Omo Omoruyi,  The Tale of June 12, (London: Press Alliance Network, 1999)
Q18) 1981
It should be noted that when the NPP led by Dr Azikiwe gave the NPN (led by Alhaji Shehu Shagari) six months notice as provided for in the accord protocol for the re-negotiation of the accord, the NPN unilaterally terminated the accord on the excuse that “if your wife gave you notice of six months . . . the husband should sack her immediately.” This was how the NPN/NPP accord was terminated in 1981 [--an accord] which the military inspired to provide a smooth transition for the Northern led political party in 1979.  (p. 339, n. 49)

The Caliphate’s efforts to stop the transition program and the 1993 elections

Q19) 1992
. .  . right from the day General Babangida assumed office there was no doubt as to whose programme we were implementing. The transition programme was a personal programme of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida. It was neither a military nor a Northern programme. This fact was never known by many people. . . When it was clear that the President was serious with the transition programme, and it seemed to them that he was actually thinking of handing over power, they [the North] initiated the removal of Chief Olu Falae from the office of the Secretary to Federal Military Government and appointed a Fulani, Alhaji Aliyu Mohammed, with a mission to turn the transition programme into a Northern driven project. . . . From late 1992 when he was convinced that the North would find it difficult to take over from the military President in a free and fair election, Alhaji Aliyu did not hide his plan to get the President to abandon the programme of democratic transition. . . [And there were] many anti-democratic plans which they [Alhaji Aliyu and the North] hatched to stop the Presidential election after March 1993. 
                                    --(pp.  xviii, xv, xvi)
Q20) 1993                    [June 12 and the Caliphate agenda]
What General Babangida did in preparation for the June 12 election was vehemently opposed by the former Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki, on behalf of the Northern leadership because the North was not able to determine its outcome in favour of the North.  Alhaji Ibrahim tried to prevail on the President to cancel the Presidential election as early as May 19, 1993 because the plan was seen as capable of reversing the British design. . . . (pp.302-303)
In fact, the civilian political group in the North wanted General Babangida to discontinue the programme partly because they did not like any of the two candidates and partly because the Hausa-Fulani did not have a candidate. This meant that the whole programme could go to blazes simply because it seemed as though it would end without someone they could control as the country’s President. Leading this group was the then Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki, who from March 1993 argued that neither Abiola nor Tofa could represent the interest of the North. Alhaji Dasuki made this known to President Babangida immediately after the National Convention of the two political parties. He continued this pressure in May 1993. He canvassed various views on what the President should do if he were to abandon the transition programme. He specifically raised this issue with me when I visited him on May 19, 1993. . . . But I kept reminding him that it was too late in the day to think of a new agenda to which he kept insisting that “my people” will not buy any of the two candidates. I kept promising him that the June 12, 1993 Presidential election would be free and fair and that the purpose of my visit to Sokoto was to preside over the training workshop for domestic monitors from Kebbi and Sokoto states. To this he said, “Professor, you work so hard for this country and for your friend, the President, but this may turn out to be a waste of your time”.     . . .The Sultan felt so agitated that he . . .  recalled what Alhaji Umaru Dikko, former Minister of Transport and the Co-ordinator of the Presidential election of Alhaji Shehu Shagari had said during the Second Republic. Dr. Dikko pointedly argued against the thought of Chief Abiola becoming the Presidential candidate of the National Party of Nigeria on the grounds that the NPN Presidential candidacy was not for sale to the highest bidder. I have gone this far to buttress the difficulties that later came from this source. General Babangida overestimated his ability with respect to what the former Sultan could do at an appropriate time. (pp. 76-77)
Q21) 1993                    [Babangida & Omoruyi discussion on 21 June 1993]
But he [Babangida] brought me right back to the immediate problem facing him. He agreed with my account, but said that he did not take his “boys” into confidence and that he had rejected the security briefs in the face of the report which I gave to him. He  said that what he told them was that he would be able to stop Chief Abiola at the appropriate time. I then asked: “Do you think you have reached that stage now?”
He said:  “Yes and No”.  
“It cannot be ‘Yes’ and ‘No’”, I uttered and continued: “With the greatest respect and with the greatest sense of responsibility and with the greatest sense of loyalty to the President and love for the country, it is late in the day”.
He was shocked by my statement. Without giving a chance for response, I went personal; and said, “This is not the appropriate time; we have passed that stage, Ibrahim. I can see your problem but the country will not take it.” While he stared at me I went on: “You cannot tell the country this.” His countenance changed and he said, “The country will just have to take it,” he said. “I cannot kill myself for the sake of what the country wants. I am sorry,” he lamented. It was astonishing to hear a General state that he could not lay down his life for his country. But I understood what he meant.
It was clear that General Babangida was in a fix as of June 21, 1993 and was in a desperate search of how to escape the wrath of his “boys.” He had lost the battle over the crucial weekend between June 18 and 21 st at Minna.
I then proceeded to deal with the questions of who were these “they” and for what reasons would they want to kill the President and the President-Elect if the June 12 election were allowed to go forward. He named them in military and in ethnic categories:
Sani (meaning General Sani Abacha)  9 is opposed to a return to civilian rule. Sani cannot stand the idea of Chief Abiola, a Yoruba, becoming his Commander-in-Chief at all; Sani seems to have the ears of the Northern leaders that no Southerner especially from the Southwest should become the President of this country. Sani seems to rally the Northern Elders to confront me on the matter. He is winning; the Sultan and the Northern leaders are of this frame of mind. Where do I go from here? They do not trust me. Without Sani, I will not be alive today; without the North, I would not have become an officer in the Nigerian Army and now the President of Nigeria.
I then asked what he would want done in the circumstance and he said
I don’t want to appear ungrateful to Sani; he may not be bright upstairs but he knows how to overthrow governments and overpower coup plotters. He saw to my coming to office in 1985 and to my protection in the many coups I faced in the past, especially the Orkar coup of 1990 where he saved me and my family including my infant daughter.”
He went on,
Sani, you know, risked his life to get me into office in 1983 and 1985; if he says that he does not want Chief Abiola, I will not force Chief Abiola on him. I just have to end the whole matter and go back to the place of my birth. That is the way I feel now.
He also named Lt. General Dogonyaro 10 and Brigadier General David Mark  11 who were too close to him and who would want the issue resolved within the shortest possible time. In fact, he quoted David Mark as saying:
I’d shoot Chief Abiola the day NEC pronounces him the elected President.
I asked the President what he would want me to do in the face of the threat to his life and the life of the incoming President. He again volunteered another issue from out of the blue which I shall discuss later. The President was in fact at that stage thinking of the military successor when he said:
I wish I can just call the “boys” and hand over to David Mark and pack my luggage and go to Minna.
I thought this was strange; but that was how his mind was working as of that date and time (1:00 PM on June 21, 1993).
. . .
I decided to probe further. I asked: “Is this all the ‘they?’ Are there still more?” To which he said, “Yes.”
The next set of people unhappy about June 12 was represented by the then Sultan of Sokoto who warned him not to undo the many years of Sardauna’s achievement for the North. The Sultan told him that the election of Chief MKO Abiola, whom he liked as a person and as a fellow Muslim, would enable the Yoruba to reverse the gains which the North had recorded since 1960. 13
13 . This was a reference to the succession crisis of 1955-1960 and how it was resolved in favour of the North. For how the North took over from Britain in 1960, see the account of the man who presided over this phase. Sir James Robertson,  Transition in Africa , (London, Hurst and Company, 1974.)}
Q22) June 1994                        [Aminu Saleh and Omoruyi discussion]
Can the ballot box change this [North as “husband” and South as “wife”] relationship? In fact, the former Secretary to the Government of the Federation [under Abacha], Alhaji Aminu Saleh, invited me to his office in June 1994 when I was still the Director-General of the Centre for Democratic Studies, to persuade me to rethink my position, that one person, one vote should not be the irreducible minimum  for the installation of a democratic government in Nigeria. 50 . . . (p. 307)
[He] specifically told me to adjust my views about the minimum requirement for democracy which was and still is “one person one vote”.  Alhaji Saleh told me in his own words his definition of democracy: “Professor, my vote is not the same weight as the vote of the Emir of Bauchi and the vote of the Emir of Bauchi is not the same weight as the vote of the Sultan of Sokoto” He then said “that is why we are not going to accept the mandate which Chief Abiola is claiming”. . . . ( p. 34)
{  50 . [Aminu Saleh’s]  was the third time I was faced with the lack of faith on the part of the Northern Leaders in the ballot box. The first was my meeting with the former Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki in May 1993, the second was with General Babangida on June 21, 1993. On this third occasion, Alhaji Aminu Saleh told me his vote was less than the vote of the Emir of Bauchi, and the vote of the Emir of Bauchi was less than the vote of the Sultan of Sokoto, and by extension, the vote of the “wife” would be less than the vote of the “husband.” Therefore, the June 12 Presidential election should not have proceeded the way it did and the results based on the sum total of the votes scored by the two candidates should not be upheld. After all, the example of 1959 Federal election was there for all to see. How Britain resolved it in favour of the North was [it] not there as the model [?]  Babangida committed a heinous crime for presiding over an election which was so free and fair. (p. 340, n. 50)}
What emerged from the fiasco in 1993 is that a voluntary handing over from the military to an elected “autonomous” Southerner 76  would never occur despite the talk of rotation. . . . (p. 327)
76  “Autonomous” Southerner, is distinct from Southerners created by the Northern leadership. Chief Abiola was seen as an “autonomous” Southerner who would not be amenable to the North despite the fact that he was the Vice President of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs. He was not created by the North. The Northern leaders believed they would not be able to manipulate him; they knew that he was too rich to be bought and they also knew that he came from a large ethnic group that was well-endowed, the Yoruba (p. 343 n. 76) }

Caliphate  ideology  and Agenda—Section C:

The British contribution to the Caliphate Ideology and agenda--A permanent Caliphate ruling class
Q24) 1913, 1982, 1992,1993
In 1913, Lord Harcourt [ British Secretary of State for the Colonies] laid down the kind of relationship that should exist between North and the South as a marriage with the North as the “husband” and the South as the “wife.” (p. 300), [see  Q7 above.]
Harcourt’s injunction of a permanent Northern ruling class seemed to have been bought by successive Northern leaders. . . . the Northern leaders have since introduced the fatalistic religious element to explain the permanent Northern ruling class in Nigeria. Three instances are worth introducing.
First was the reply Alhaji Shehu Shagari (the elected President of Nigeria 1979-1983) gave to Chief MKO Abiola in 1982 when the chief wanted to seek the Presidential nomination of the NPN in accordance with the original understanding within the leadership of the party that the Northern zone would retain the office of the President for one term of four years (1979-1983). The original plan, according to Chief Abiola, was that the position should be made to rotate to the three zones in the South in 1983. But the Northern leaders’ interpretation was that zoning did not imply rotation. According to Alhaji Shagari,
Well, Chief, you know it is all in the natural order of things. A country is just like a farm where everyone has his functions.  Allah has willed it that someone must hold the cow by the horns while another does the milking.”  16 (Italics mine)
President Shagari’s men asked Chief Abiola to name his price in terms of oil lifting and other perquisites. What this meant was that Chief Abiola could be “a cheerful rogue” of the kind of Chief Okotie-Eboh who was destined by Allah “to hold the cow by the horns” and the likes of Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and Alhaji Shehu Shagari who were destined by Allah “to do the milking and sharing.” Southerners have been holding “the cow by the horns” and the Northerners have been doing the “milking and sharing” since 1960. . . .
The second incident was the [1992] statement attributed to my former Chairman at the CDS, and friend, and spokesman of the Northern Elders Council, Alhaji Yusuf Maitama Sule, that Allah knew what he was doing when he gave different talents to different groups in Nigeria. The Igbo are destined to be businessmen and the Yoruba, excellent administrators, civil servants and teachers; and the Hausa-Fulani, political leaders. Alhaji Yusuf then pleaded with his fellow Nigerians to allow the will of Allah to stand, for after all, if Allah wanted all Nigerians to be of the same stock, language and talent, Allah would have done it. Election cannot change Allah's plan for the people of Nigeria. 57
57 . Well reported in all Nigerian newspapers } [See  Q3 above ]
The third incident was the plea of the former Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki and many Islamic leaders in the North to Chief MKO Abiola, to allow the will of Allah to hold; that if Allah wanted him to be the President of Nigeria, no mortal would stop him. This, in effect, meant that it was Allah that denied him the verdict of the electorate. 58  
58 . This was reported in the media in 1993; what the Southern Muslims do not know is that the Northern Muslims do not believe that Southern Muslims are good Muslims; they are regarded as second class Muslims. I wonder what they feel about the new Igbo Muslims.}
(pp. 300, 310-311, 340)

Caliphate succession to the British, political as well as economic: the violent consequences

Sir James’ appointment was by design. He spent his productive years as a British Foreign/Colonial Officer promoting Arab/Muslim control of the Sudan and worked hard to do the same thing in Nigeria. He fell in love with the North as soon as he arrived Nigeria and he “was struck by the similarity between Northern Provinces adjoining the Sahara and the Central Sudan” and observed that “the people around Kano were similar to the Sudanese” and he made sure that the colonial Governors in the North were those who had Arabic/Islamic experience.
It should be emphasised that this succession also included sucession to the ownership rights over land, minerals and mineral oil and the British interests in Nigeria including Shell-BP. The Civil War of the 1960’s, the annulment of the 1993 election, the state terrorism in the oil producing areas culminating in the brutal execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa are partly, if not wholly, as a result of OIL MONEY.
The coalition government in 1959-64 between the NPC and the NCNC and the accord in 1979-81 between the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) were in furtherance of the “husband” and “wife” relationship with the Northerner, the husband, and the Southerners, the wife, in the language of Lord Harcourt.
Today, the “Southern Lady of Means” is richer and the bridegroom “the well conducted youth” from the North is poorer and poorer over the years, a situation not even anticipated in 1914. Hence the “husband” in the typical Nigerian fashion would ensure that the relationship is maintained at all cost, even if it means killing the bride in order to take over her wealth. This is the situation the oil producing part of the South finds itself in today. According to Alhaji Gambo Jimeta, the North (husband) will go to war over oil.” 
(pp. 306-307)

Genocide for oil

Q26) 2009                          Genocidal incitement by Bala N’Allah, a Caliphate legislator
A member of the Nigerian House of Representatives, Bala Ibn N'Allah of Kebbi State.  In an unprovoked statement, [has] called for the extermination of 20 million Niger Deltans in order to allow the rest of Nigeria to live in peace. His harrowing words were the following:
“What is happening in the Niger Delta is pure criminality of the highest order, arising from total disregard for constituted authority. In Iraq, thousands of people lost their lives because of an insurrection against the government during the reign of former Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein. We can do away with 20 million militants for the rest 120 million Nigerians to live” (see  The Guardian, Thursday, May 28, 2009).
Of course, this Arewa militant would not hesitate to use the Nigerian military to curb other Nigerian nationalities if Arewa were to succeed in its intentions in the Niger Delta. Indeed, it appears to be the case that a leading segment of thought in Arewa Consultative Forum regards politics as a game of conquest in which it is legitimate to employ Nigeria’s military resources in pursuit of its ambition of ruling the rest of the country.
We must press the point that statements such as Bala Ibn N’Allah’s incitement to genocide were always precursors to appalling incidents of genocide in Yugoslavia in Central Europe, Rwanda in Central Africa,
Daily Independent (Lagos)

Bloodbath in 2015?  the Prospect

Q 27) March 2012
This time around [Lawal Kaita] is insisting that a Northerner must emerge by 2015 or there would be no Nigeria. Kaita said “We hear rumours all over that Jonathan is planning to contest in 2015. Well, the north is going to be prepared if the country remains one. That is, if the country remains one, we are going to fight for it. If not, everybody can go his way,” he said in an interview in Katsina. Lawal Kaita said the recent stand of the party on consensus was a total negation of the motive behind forming the party.
It may be recalled that Alhaji Lawal Kaita had said in October 2010 that “The North is determined, if that happens, to make the country ungovernable for President Jonathan or any other Southerner who finds his way to the seat of power on the platform of the PDP against the principle of the party’s zoning policy”.
Q28) May 2012
Buhari warned that should what happened in 2011 elections repeat itself in 2015 [i.e. if he was not declared the winner] “the dog and the baboon would all be soaked in blood”.
The demand that “a Northerner must emerge” in 2015 is a demand that the 2015 election be rigged in advance for the Caliphate candidate, regardless of how Nigerians actually vote.  That is a negation of democracy. It is a demand to get the presidency by intimidation and threats of violence. And it is in keeping with the Caliphate’s annulment of the results of the June 12, 1993 election, and with their opposition to any election whose result they cannot guarantee in advance. It is a continuation of their belief in gaining power by violence rather than by free and fair elections. 
Now, Buhari and Lawal Keita would not be issuing these bloodthirsty threats today if the Caliphate still had its old instruments of state violence. They would have long before now seized power by unleashing coups, army massacres, pogroms and civil war on Nigerians like they did in 1966.
And here we come to the end of this display of statements of the Caliphate ideology by its leaders, during the period 1942-2012: an anti-democracy ideology with a strong commitment to their conquest and Islamization of Nigeria, a feudal caste structure of society, genocide to enforce exploitation, implacable opposition to free and fair elections, a penchant for extra judicial killings of political opponents, and pogroms and other brands of political violence.


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